The New Threat of ‘Influencers’
nfluencers easy targets for exploitation in anti-national activities. Recent incidents highlight just how real this threat is.
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On June 4 in Punjab, a YouTuber named Jasbir Singh was arrested. He was found to be in contact with Jyoti Malhotra, who was accused of spying for Pakistan, and similar charges were filed against him. Following the Pahalgam attack and "Operation Sindoor", security agencies launched a crackdown in Punjab and Haryana, arresting several YouTubers. Investigations are still ongoing, and a disturbing trend has emerged: social media influencers are being used for espionage. This poses a new challenge to national security—one that demands novel responses. Similar patterns have been observed in Europe and the U.S. as well.
The face of social media that now
worries Indian security was revealed in full during “Operation Sindoor”. Not
only Pakistan’s intelligence agency ISI but also other foreign intelligence
bodies are seen using influencers to serve their agenda. Jyoti Malhotra, who
was arrested in Hisar, Haryana, ran a travel and tourism channel with 3.77 lakh
subscribers on YouTube and 1.33 lakh followers on Instagram. She reportedly
came into contact with Ehsan-ur-Rahim alias Danish at the Pakistan High
Commission in Delhi while applying for a visa. (India recently expelled
Danish.) Through him, she received expedited visa access and made three trips
to Pakistan.
During these visits, she was
introduced to ISI agents, and efforts began to groom her as a spy. The initial
step involved using her channel to spread misinformation and propaganda
favorable to Pakistan. She was granted easy access within Pakistan, traveled to
China, and even visited Bali. It was found that one ISI agent extracted several
tasks from her, including spreading positive content about Pakistan and
providing sensitive information about strategically important Indian sites.
Even while in India, she remained in contact with her Pakistani handlers and
shared information. After the Pahalgam attack, she released a video defending
Pakistan’s innocence, as per the investigators.
Jyoti Malhotra is just one example.
Many others are suspected to have been lured in a similar manner. Danish
reportedly contacted several such individuals, especially targeting women from
economically or socially vulnerable backgrounds, and developed them as ‘soft
assets’. These influencers were encouraged to use apps like Telegram, and they
were paid for their services. Jasbir Singh, arrested in Punjab, had over 1.1
million followers and was also lured similarly. He was provided assistance in
visiting Pakistan, where he received VIP treatment, which overwhelmed him and
drew him deeper into espionage. Upon returning to India, he was enticed with
money and reportedly began passing sensitive military and other classified
information to Pakistan-based contacts.
Not all those who visited Pakistan
were involved in spying, but investigators noted unusual patterns in the
travels of some individuals, prompting further inquiries upon their return.
With influencers now posting photos
and videos of military bases, convoys, or border areas, intelligence agencies
no longer need to physically gather such data themselves. If these images are
geotagged, they become especially valuable to hostile actors. Infrastructure
like bridges, airports, or roads under construction can be documented in these
videos, and foreign entities may analyze them for information on troop
movements, types of vehicles, and other logistical details. Influencers often
have access to restricted locations through their networks, which could further
compromise national security.
A few months ago, a man in Gujarat
was caught impersonating a PMO official and had managed to visit multiple
government offices. Similar misuse of identity and access could easily occur in
the influencer space. Geotagged content can be compiled, and narratives
supportive of hostile nations can be created. Posts may portray the Indian
government or military as aggressive, thereby influencing public opinion—a
tactic frequently employed by adversaries. Honey-trap techniques are also used
to lure officials in sensitive institutions. What used to require great risk
and effort in traditional espionage can now be achieved through online
reactions, sentiment analysis, and engagement patterns on influencer posts.
Influencers aren’t just being used
for spying, but also as tools to shape public narratives. The economic appeal
of views and engagement, leading to fame and income, is a strong motivator.
Many influencers are drawn into this web either by monetary benefits or the
attention and reach they gain—only to find it difficult to escape once caught
in the loop.
This exploitation of influencers is
not exclusive to Pakistan. China’s Communist Party has also used similar
tactics to shape narratives and influence public opinion in countries like
India. Research and news reports are manipulated as part of this strategy.
Influencers engaging in social or cultural discourse online may unwittingly
become part of China’s propaganda apparatus. A few months ago, the U.S.
launched ads targeting disillusioned members of the Communist Party, urging
them to share information. In 2022, several influencers in the U.S. and Europe
were arrested for allegedly working for Russia. These young influencers, often
in their 30s, were accused of spreading false news, misleading public opinion,
and fomenting political unrest.
Social media is now an inseparable part of modern life. As the British Council noted, “There is nothing left that’s truly offline. Even when you’re not online, you’re still online.” This reality must be taken seriously. As we continue to use and follow social media influencers, awareness about the potential threats they pose is vital.
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